 disjoint -no proposition is a member more than one domain; although this assumption is by no means necessary in what follows. Because the approach to validity given below is consistent with a wide variety of views about the nature and number of domains, these issues are left for further exploration elsewhere.
Suppose there is a domain for moral discourse, and a domain for descriptive discourse.
Presumably, we can make the following inference:
. Torture is wrong.
. The United States tortured prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison.
. So, the United States did something wrong. Now, () seems morally true. And () is descriptively true. Can we then validly infer the (morally true, but not descriptively true) conclusion?
Tappolet [] writes:
The validity of an inference requires that the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion. [. . . ] For the conclusion to hold, some unique truth predicate must apply to all three sentences. But what truth predicate is that? And if there is such a truth predicate, why isn't it the only one we need? () These questions are intended as a problem for truth pluralists generally.  Tappolet sees the problem as trilemma: either (a) reject that any mixed inferences are valid, (b) accept a general property that is preserved over mixed inferences, or (c) reject the standard characterization of validity as necessary truth preservation. Tappolet regards option (a) as unpalatable given the existence of mixed inferences like the example above. In response to option (b), Tappolet worries that this general property is to be thought of as a truth property. And as such, Tappolet is here giving voice to what some have called the 'instability challenge'.  But the instability challenge is largely a problem for weak pluralists; and so I leave debate over horn  Tappolet puts the problem in terms of truth predicates, but can easiliy be translated into talk of truth properties. For more detail on the property/predicate distinction and how it relates to truth pluralism, see [] .
 See Pedersen [] for a description of the challenge, and lines of response. See also Cory Wright [] .

(b) to them.  Option (c) is thought to be a last resort; Tappolet suggests that one ought to reject truth pluralism before revising the concept of validity.
At first glance, however, the third horn of the trilemma does not appear to be too sharp.
A proof-theoretic characterization of validity seems an obvious non-revisionary suggestion.
Tappolet [] considers this response. [] and Scharp [, ] who both conclude from the semantic paradoxes that we need two kinds of truth to do the job Tappolet thinks can be done by general truth.
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
Debate over the innocence of plurals is beyond our scope here, and so we set this approach aside.
JC Beall [] proceeds via a similar strategy. He has given a many-valued (re)interpretation of validity according to which truth properties are modeled by designated values, a standard notion in some non-classical logics. Designation, a purely model-theoretic notion, is preserved across valid inferences, not truth. Tappolet [] has contended that, in effect, Beall is using designation as a general truth property.
It remains true that sentences which are T 1 and sentences which are T 2 share a common feature -they are designated. And it is difficult to believe this is not a kind of truth. ()
Thus, Tappolet believes Beall's approach likewise fails to avoid horn (b) of the trilemma as well. I have previously argued (with Caret [] ), that designation is not a kind of truth. And so I think Beall's proposal is amenable to the strong pluralist. However, there are those who share Tappolet's suspicion that, if a single property is being preserved over all valid inferences then that property is really truth. So, to make things particularly difficult on the strong pluralist, let us set this approach aside as well.
If I have tracked the dialectic correctly, behind Tappolet's dilemma there is a truly difficult challenge to the strong pluralist.
Hard Problem of Mixed Inferences Give standard, non-revisionary, semantic account of the validity of mixed inferences that does not appeal (implicitly or explicitly) to any single property that is preserved.
This might appear to be an impossible task -that Tappolet has set herself up for a slam dunk.
But I claim strong pluralists can meet the challenge. The key to meeting the challenge is an algebraic semantics, and a corresponding definition of validity.
 Validity for Strong Truth Pluralists
To solve the Hard Problem of Mixed Inferences, I give a formal semantics together with an algebraic definition of validity that models the strong pluralist's view. I then show that validity
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. A Formal Semantics
To model validity for strong pluralists, we need to first model the notion that each domain of discourse has a different truth property. To begin, our semantic values V are ordered n-tuples,
where n is the number of domains. Each member of the tuple is either a 1 or a 0.
If 1 appears in the ith place, this represents that the proposition is in domain i and is true i ; 0 in the ith place represents that the proposition is in domain i and is false i . One should be careful not to think of the numeral 1 as being or even representing a truth property. It is merely a marker that represents that a proposition has the relevant truth property for its domain. In particular, one should not assume that the same numeral appearing in different places in the tuple means that the same truth property is had in different domains. (More on this possible confusion later, in §.)
Assume that atomic propositions have exactly one truth property (if they have any at all).  So, our atomic values are given thus:
Now we define valuation functions on the set of propositions. A valuation is admissible iff it satisfies the following:
. , a n then ν(¬A) = 1 − (a 1 ), . . . , 1 − (a n ) .
 As noted earlier, this assumption may be dropped. Shapiro [] has noted that in a first-order setting with a truth predicte (plus resources for diagonalization) the distinction between atomic and compound propositions is less than clear cut. Now towards defining consequence; first define the algebraic order on our set of values:
It is easy enough to show that this is a partial order. For reflexivity, ν(A∨A) = a 1 + a 1 , . . . , a n + a n = a 1 , . . . , a n = ν(A), since 1+1 = 1 and 0+0 = 0. For antisymmetry, assuming ν(A∨B) = ν(B) and
(B). For transitivity, assuming ν(A∨B) = ν(B) and ν(B∨C) = ν(C), we know that ν((A∨B)∨C) = ν(C) by substitution.
By associativity of ∨ and substitution, we have ν(A ∨ C) = ν(C).
Using this partial order, we can define logical consequence for strong pluralists thus:
That is, an argument from X to A is valid whenever the conjunction of the premises in X has a value less than (or equal to) the value of the conclusion.
. is Classical
One might wonder what logic is given by SP . The answer: classical propositional logic. Here is why. Second, I note that disjunction distributes over conjunction:
. . , a n + (b n × c n ) by the semantics for
. . , (a n + b n ) × (a n + c n ) just is the correct semantic value for (A∨B)∧(A∨C).
Algebraically, we have a distributive lattice. Informally, this guarantees that conjunctions and disjunctions behave nicely with each other. These facts constitute a proof that V , ∨, ∧, ¬, , ⊥ is a Boolean Algebra, since all complemented distributive lattices are Boolean algebras. That means that SP as defined above is just the consequence relation of classical propositional logic. In the standard semantics of classical logic, the Boolean algebra simply consists of the values and ⊥ with the usual operations. But any Boolean algebra suffices, including the one given by the formal semantics above.
. Solving the Problem
Strong pluralists can now deliver an account of validity that satisfies Tappolet's demands.
Recall that the Hard Problem of Mixed Inferences was to give standard, non-revisionary, se-
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 mantic account of validity that does not appeal (implicitly or explicitly) to any single property that is preserved.
Algebraic conceptions of validity are a completely standard idea. Algebraic semantics are perhaps some of the most useful methods in the study of logic, and have led to countless developments in its history. Algebraic conceptions of logical consequence are at least as old as semantics for classical propositional logic itself -indeed, Boolean algebras were developed for precisely this purpose. Of the three dominant approaches to logical consequence -prooftheoretic, algebraic, and model-theoretic -the youngest is model theory.
The fact that SP is extensionally equivalent to the classical truth-preservation account should serve to alleviate the thought that this notion of validity is somehow revisionary. Monists all. What these considerations show is that arguments with the right sort of formal structure are valid regardless of whether the premises are interpreted as being from the same domain or entirely different domains. Whether an inference is 'mixed' or not has no effect on the question of its validity. And the strong pluralist can achieve this without any explicit or implicit appeal to a single general truth property, relying only on the many domain-specific truth properties.
 Thanks to Dave Ripley for discussion here.

I conclude that the strong pluralist can solve the Hard Problem of Mixed Inferences.
 Extending the Idea
I have shown that the above consequence relation is entirely coextensive with classical logic.
There are those for whom this would be an unwelcome result. Indeed, some truth pluralists have endorsed the view that, not only truth, but also valid inference varies across domains of discourse. Lynch [, ] has recently suggested that truth pluralism has a natural fit with a certain kind of logical pluralism.  Moreover, Wright [] has suggested that the correct account of truth in epistemically constrained domains might be something like superassertability, which sits most naturally within intuitionistic logic. In this section, I extend the algebraic account of validity to non-classical domains, showing how the account can handle domains for which paracomplete, paraconsistent, and intuitionistic logic seem most appropriate.
. Many-Valued Domains
In the classical semantics given above, it was assumed that for every truth-apt proposition p and every domain i , p is either true i or false i . That is, if a proposition does not have the truth property for a given domain, then it must have the falsity property for that domain. Moreover, if p is true i and false everywhere else, then its negation ¬p is true j for all j i. But these assumptions might well be questioned. For example, why think that the negation of a true descriptive proposition must be morally true, mathematically true, etc.?
To alleviate these concerns, one might move to a non-classical logic.  Let us introduce a third component, 
 This logical pluralism is domain-relative, and as such distinct from the view endorsed by Restall and Beall [] .
 But see Azzouni and Bueno [] , and Greenough [] for recent attempts to accommodate 'indeterminacy' within a classical framework.
It has been assumed throughout that atomic propositions are members of exactly one domain.  So, atomic values will be undefined in every place but one. Consequence for this logic is treated in the same algebraic way: 
. Intuitionism
Paraconsistent and paracomplete logics are not standardly endorsed by pluralists.  However, recently Lynch [, ] , following an earlier suggestion by Wright [] , has suggested that intuitionistic logic is the appropriate logic for domains of discourse that are epistemically constrained. It is worth showing, then, that the algebraic definition of validity is amenable to intuitionistic logic being the correct logic for some domains of discourse.
To begin, we need to explain the notion of a Heyting algebra. Heyting algebras are generalizations of Boolean algebras. But instead of being complemented as in §., they are pseudocomplemented. Formally, H, +, ×, ⇒, 1, 0 is a Heyting algebra iff:
• H, +, ×, 1, 0 is a bounded distributive lattice; and
• for every a, b ∈ H there is a greatest element x ∈ H such that a × x ≤ c (this element is the relative pseudo-complement and is denoted a ⇒ b).
In Heyting algebras (and intuitionistic logic generally), negation is defined: if ν(A) = a then ν(¬A) a ⇒ 0. Now, toward defining our set of semantic values, let H 1 , . . . , H n be arbitrary Heyting algebras, one for each 'domain'. Now, semantic values will be n-tuples such that at each ith place is a member of the Heyting algebra H i . V = { a 1 , . . . , a n | each a i ∈ H i } As in the semantics prior, 1 in the ith place represents that the proposition is in domain i and has the property true i . Likewise for 0 in the ith place and false i . Atomic values are such that there is a 1 or 0 in a single coordinate.
V α = { a 1 , . . . , a n | ∃!i(a i ∈ {1, 0}, a j ∈ H j where j i)}  In early drafts, Lynch [] experimented with using Strong Kleene as the logic for some domains, eventually siding with intuitionistic logic.
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
The semantics for our connectives are defined similarly as the classical case: conjunctions are component-wise greatest lower bounds; disjunctions are component-wise least upper bounds.
The only difference is addition of a binary conditional operator, and a revised negation clause: '. For all propositions A, if ν(A) = a 1 , . . . , a n , then ν(¬A) = a 1 ⇒ 0, . . . , a n ⇒ 0 .
Consequence I can be defined in the standard algebraic way.
Defining values and connectives in this way is sufficient for V , ∨, ∧, →, , ⊥ itself to be a Heyting algebra.  The fact that admissible valuations consider arbitrary Heyting algebras H 1 , . . . , H n as our basis gives us the result that I is equivalent to intuitionistic logic.
Finally, because all Boolean algebras are Heyting algebras, our choice of any H i could well have been Boolean. This is consistent with the idea that, even if intuitionistic logic is appropriate for reasoning within some domains, classical logic might still be maintained as the correct logic for reasoning within other domains.
To conclude, the Hard Problem of Mixed Inferences can be solved to Tappolet's specifications. Strong pluralists about truth do not need to appeal to any single general truth property in order to have a standard, non-revisionary, semantic account of validity. Moreover, they can allow that the logic of unmixed inferences can sometimes be domain-dependent. There is no barrier to extending this strong pluralist solution to a logical pluralism. 
